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In a pluralistic society, judges can enrich their communities and their
own lives by participation in those civic, charitable, and avocational
activities best suited to their talents, interests, and backgrounds. A
judge can preserve the integrity of the judicial office without under-
going complete isolation from community life.1
—U.S. Judicial Conference, Committee on Codes of Conduct,
Advisory Opinion No. 80
Too often drafters of ethical standards fail to scrutinize a proposed
restriction on a judge’s off-bench activities against the specific ratio-
nale supporting the government’s right to interfere with the political,
social, charitable and other personal undertakings of a judge. Instead,
a “gut-feeling” as to the propriety or impropriety, prudence or impru-
dence, of a particular extrajudicial act is substituted for a “restriction
vs. rationale” analysis. It is especially important to conduct this analy-
sis before concluding that a judge’s civic or charitable involvement
* L.L.M., Georgetown University; J.D., B.A., Marquette University. The author owes
a significant debt to Judge Raymond J. McKoski, whose article on charitable fund-raising
by judges prompted this article, and who was a constant source of help and encouragement
throughout the research and writing process. He further wishes to thank Professor Paul
Secunda, Jud Campbell, and Matt Fernholz for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
Article. This Article was completed and accepted for publication before the author’s current
employment began, and does not represent the views of his current or former employers.
1 U.S. Judicial Conference Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Op. 80 (2009), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/Vol02B
-Ch02.pdf.
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does “measurable damage” to the judiciary because, unlike purely
personal pursuits, philanthropic activities benefit the judiciary, the
legal profession, and the community at large.2
—Judge Raymond J. McKoski, Vice Chair,
Illinois Judicial Ethics Committee
INTRODUCTION
Just a block from the dragon archway marking the entrance to the Chinatown
neighborhood of Washington, D.C., stands historic Calvary Baptist Church. Like
many buildings in the nation’s capital city, its facade is adorned by a small, weather-
worn bronze plaque near the entrance: “In this building on May 16–17, 1907 the
Northern Baptist Convention was formed and the Hon. Charles Evans Hughes elected
its first president.”3 At the time, Hughes was governor of New York—he would later
serve as Secretary of State, an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, and Chief
Justice of the United States.4 He stayed involved in the Convention and Baptist affairs
throughout his long career at the pinnacle of the legal profession.5
Chief Justice Hughes was hardly alone in pursuing both a career on the bench and
an avocational lay leadership role in his church. Justice Bushrod Washington, a John
Adams appointee, was a founding vice president of the American Bible Society (ABS),
along with former Chief Justice John Jay and future Justice Smith Thompson, who
was at the time chief justice of the State of New York.6 Thompson continued with the
ABS once he became a member of the U.S. Supreme Court, and was eventually joined
in both institutions by Chief Justice John Marshall.7 Justice John McLean8 and Chief
Justice Salmon P. Chase also served as ABS vice presidents while on the Court.9
Similarly, the American Sunday School Union (ASSU) counted Justice Washing-
ton among its slate of vice presidents.10 Several years later, Chief Justice Marshall
2 Raymond J. McKoski, Charitable Fund-Raising by Judges: The Give and Take of the
2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 769, 783 (2008).
3 As observed by author at 755 Eighth Street, NW, Washington, DC 20001.
4 Aaron Weaver, The Church-State Jurisprudence and Contributions of Charles Evans
Hughes, 28 AM. BAPTIST Q. 180 (1980).
5 See generally id. at 180.
6  1 ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY: WITH AN ACCOUNT OF ITS
ORGANIZATION; LIST OF OFFICERS AND MANAGERS, OF LIFE DIRECTORS AND LIFE MEMBERS,
249 (1838) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY]. Joining them
the next year as vice presidents of the ABS were the chief justices of New Jersey and
Pennsylvania. Id. at 289.
7 Id. at 767.
8 ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY, supra note 6, at 885. Also
joining that year was Judge Jesse L. Holman of the U.S. Circuit Court, Indiana. Id.
9 American Bible Society, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1865, http://www.nytimes.com/1865/05
/07/news/american-bible-society.html.
10 THE FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN SUNDAY-SCHOOL UNION 22 (1825).
He was joined on the board by Judge James H. Peck of the U.S. District Court, Missouri. Id.
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and Justice McLean both joined ASSU as vice presidents;11 McLean would later be
elected its president.12
A year after Justice McLean left the Court, Justice Samuel F. Miller joined it.
While he was a justice, he served three years as president of the National Unitarian
Conference.13 His colleague, Justice William Strong, was president of the National
Reform Association (NRA), his era’s version of the Christian Coalition.14 Justice
Strong, in turn, served alongside Justice David Josiah Brewer. Born abroad during his
father’s service as an evangelist, Justice Brewer served as an officer of the American
Missionary Association for many years.15 A lifelong and devoted Presbyterian,
Brewer’s friend, Justice John Marshall Harlan served as a trustee, president of the
board of trustees, and ruling elder of his local congregation, the New York Avenue
Presbyterian Church.16 He also served as trustee of Murray Bay Church, near where
his family spent summers in Quebec.17 In addition to his involvement at the local
level, Justice Harlan led his denomination both as part of a committee to study the
construction of a national Presbyterian cathedral in Washington, D.C., and as vice
moderator of the national Presbyterian Church.18
Appointed with significant support from America’s Catholic hierarchy, Justice
Pierce Butler served on the Catholic University of America’s Board of Trustees for
eight years19—the president of the university described him as “a tower of strength
to the whole movement” during a capital fund-raising campaign.20
At one point, Washington labeled himself a “faithful friend and admirer” of the Union, and he
expressed his hope “[t]hat heaven may prosper the benevolent work in which the Sunday-school
Union are engaged, so honourable to them, and so beneficial to our country[.]” THE FIFTH
REPORT OF THE AMERICAN SUNDAY-SCHOOL UNION 31 (1829) (quoting Letter from Bushrod
Washington, Supreme Court Justice, to the American Sunday School Union’s Committee on
Publication (Apr. 27, 1829)).
11 THE SIXTH REPORT OF THE AMERICAN SUNDAY-SCHOOL UNION 18 (1830) (listing
Marshall and McLean as vice presidents). McLean continued to serve many years after Marshall.
12 THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN SUNDAY-SCHOOL UNION 80–81
(1849) (reporting McLean’s unanimous election as president).
13 JAY ALAN SEKULOW, WITNESSING THEIR FAITH: RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE ON SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES AND THEIR OPINIONS 66 (2006).
14 Id. at 126. The NRA pushed for an amendment to the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution
to acknowledge America’s Christian heritage.
15 J. Gordon Hylton, The Judge Who Abstained in Plessy v. Ferguson: Justice David
Brewer and the Problem of Race, 61 MISS. L.J. 315, 318 (1991).
16 James W. Gordon, Religion and the First Justice Harlan: A Case Study in Late
Nineteenth Century Presbyterian Constitutionalism, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 317, 334 (2001).
17 Id. at 335.
18 LOREN P. BETH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: THE LAST WHIG JUSTICE 171, 187 (1992).
19 John T. Noonan, Jr., The Catholic Justices of the United States Supreme Court, 67
CATH. HIST. REV. 369, 376 n.25 (1981).
20 C. JOSEPH NUESSE, THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY
277 (1990).
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What a different world Chief Justice Hughes and his brother Justices would find
in 2011, thanks to the advent of judicial ethics rules. Though he could be a member
of the Northern Baptist Convention, he could not serve as president21 or treasurer.22
Though he could deliver a speech at the opening of a new church, he could not give
a sermon every week from the same pulpit as a part-time pastor.23 In those speeches,
he could urge the audience to embrace faith, hope, and love, but not charity.24 Though
he could appear as the guest of honor at a fund-raising dinner for the law school at
a church-affiliated university, he could not do the same for its seminary.25 He could
invite friends to join the American Bar Association, but not the Gideons or Knights
of Columbus.26 All of these restrictions, and more, stem from the American Bar
Association (ABA)’s 2007 Model Code of Judicial Conduct and official interpreta-
tions of state versions of that code.
Many, if not all, of these limitations could not survive constitutional scrutiny.
Admittedly, the government, as employer, may legally restrict the personal speech and
expressive association of its employees.27 But taking a government job is not a total
abdication of all constitutional rights, particularly those exercised outside the work-
place. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that government employees re-
tain constitutional protections and that the government must justify its intrusions on
employee rights.28
This Article begins by reviewing the government employee line of cases, start-
ing with United Public Workers v. Mitchell in 1947.29 The first section concludes that
the modified Pickering balancing test set forth in United States v. National Treasury
Employees Union (NTEU)30 is the appropriate level of scrutiny for judicial conduct
rules. The body of this Article reviews ways in which the four canons of the ABA
21 Fla. Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op. 85/4 (1985), available at
http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/eighty5/85-04.html.
22 Md. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 1975-10 (1975), available at http://www.courts.state
.md.us/ethics/opinions/1970s/1975-10.pdf.
23 Va. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 08-1 (2008) (withdrawn, Feb. 17, 2010); Kan.
Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. JE-25 (1988), available at http://www.kscourts.org/pdf
/ClerkCt/JE25.pdf.
24 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 3.7(A)(3) (2007) (prohibiting judges from
soliciting contributions for religious organizations from persons outside the judge’s family).
25 Id. at 3.7(A)(4) (permitting judges to speak at fund-raising dinners only for organizations
that “concern[] the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice[.]”).
26 Id. at 3.7(A)(3) (permitting judges to solicit membership only for organizations that are
“concerned with the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice[.]”).
27 See, e.g., United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 102 (1947).
28 See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). In fact, one might turn
the proposition to the affirmative and say that “conspicuously unlike a private employer, [the
Government] must respect its employees’ First Amendment rights[.]” Locurto v. Giuliani,
447 F.3d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 2006).
29 330 U.S. at 103 (upholding the Hatch Act).
30 513 U.S. 454, 468 (1995) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571).
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Model Code of Judicial Ethics and official interpretations of and rulings regarding
them limit the religious activities of judges. I conclude that numerous applications
of the Model Code are unconstitutional infringements on judges’ First Amendment
rights to free speech, free association, and free exercise of religion.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
The codes of judicial conduct should be interpreted in line with the U.S.
Constitution. In defining its scope the ABA Model Code notes that “The Rules of
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct are rules of reason that should be applied con-
sistent with constitutional requirements, statutes, other court rules, and decisional
law[.]”31 In the wake of Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,32 much of the consti-
tutional litigation regarding judicial ethics codes has focused on restrictions on cam-
paign activity by judicial candidates.33 However, this should not excuse judicial conduct
panels, when issuing advisory opinions, from considering the constitutional rights of
sitting judges. As Judge Howland Abramson, past chairman of Pennsylvania’s judicial
ethics committee, has written, “[J]udicial ethics advisory committees should be mind-
ful of the United States Constitution in rendering their advice and, at the very least,
should adhere to binding constitutional precedents. However, to properly fulfill their
duties, they should consider all constitutional precedents, such as those from other
jurisdictions. . . .”34 Judge Abramson has it right. Judicial conduct panels should
31 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Scope (2007). I should note at the start that I focus
on the ABA’s Model Code because it “comes with a presumption of authority, and state and
federal courts are likely to adopt it.” Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Ethics, the Appearance of
Impropriety, and the Proposed New ABA Judicial Code, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1337, 1359
(2006); see also Jon C. Blue, A Well-Tuned Cymbal? Extrajudicial Political Activity, 18 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 5–6 (2004) (referring to the Model Code as the “current ‘gold standard’
canonical text.”). I do not cover the history of the Code because it has been so thoroughly
recounted elsewhere. See, e.g., Andrew J. Lievense & Avern Cohn, The Federal Judiciary
and the ABA Model Code: The Parting of the Ways, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 271 (2007).
32 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
33 Ctr. for Judicial Ethics, Case-law Following Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,
536 U.S. 765 (2002), AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y (May 2, 2011), http://www.ajs.org/ethics/pdfs
/CaselawafterWhite.pdf.
34 Howland W. Abramson & Gary Lee, Judicial Ethics Advisory Committees Should
Render Opinions Which Adhere to Binding United States Constitutional Precedents, 41 DUQ.
L. REV. 269, 305 (2003); see In re Hey, 452 S.E.2d 24, 29 (W.Va. 1994) (“Unquestionably, it
is within this Court’s power to discipline judges. . . . But in doing so, we have a corresponding
duty not to ignore judges’ constitutionally protected rights.” (internal citations omitted)). But
see Ark. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2006-02 (2006), available at http://www.state
.ar.us/jeac/opinions/advisory_2006_02.pdf (declining, based on the committee’s mandate, to
consider whether a challenged judicial conduct rule was constitutional); Kan. Judicial Ethics
Advisory Panel, Op. JE 139 (2006), available at http://www.kscourts.org/pdf/ClerkCt/JE139
.pdf (same).
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incorporate relevant constitutional law when considering inquiries from judges who
wish to engage in religious activities and expression.
A. Identifying the Correct Constitutional Standard
As in any case involving a question of constitutional law, the first step is to identify
the relevant constitutional text(s). The First Amendment guarantees that Congress shall
pass no law “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion, or “abridging the freedom of
speech” or “the right of the people peaceably to assemble,”35 which also includes a
right to private association.36 The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates these rights
against the state governments, which administer the judicial ethics codes governing
state judges.37
The real challenge, of course, is to determine from the Court’s precedents the ap-
propriate doctrine or line of cases for this particular issue. Here, the public employee
line of cases fits best. These regulations do not limit the activities of judges as candi-
dates for election or retention, so Republican Party of Minnesota v. White is not the
right standard.38 Moreover, because public employees do not enjoy the same level of
rights protection as regular citizens, the hybrid-claim analysis for free exercise based
on Employment Division v. Smith does not fit.39 Instead, as the U.S. Court of Appeals
35 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
36 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (explaining that “[i]t is be-
yond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas
is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech”).
37 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (incorporating the free exercise
clause); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (incorporating the assembly clause and
freedom of association); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (incorporating the
freedom of speech clause).
38 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (striking down a state judicial ethics canon which limited the
free speech of judicial candidates). The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, applied
strict scrutiny to the canon, asking whether it was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
government interest. Id. at 774–75. After an extensive discussion of judicial impartiality, the
Court concluded that it failed this test, and struck the regulation down. Id. at 788. However, the
Court treated the regulation as one on judicial candidates, not one on judges proper. Id. at 768
(referring to “candidates for judicial election”). Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, spe-
cifically noted and set aside the public employee cases. Id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“Whether the rationale of Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will
Cty., and Connick v. Myers could be extended to allow a general speech restriction on sitting
judges—regardless of whether they are campaigning—in order to promote the efficient admin-
istration of justice, is not an issue raised here.”) (internal citations omitted).
39 Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 375 (1882) (upholding a federal statute that made it un-
lawful for federal employees, other than presidential appointees, to request, give, or receive
from any other government officer any money for political purposes). Since Curtis, the Court
has consistently held that activities that the government can not restrict if done by citizens,
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for the Seventh Circuit has twice stated, the public employee cases provide the best
framework to analyze the judicial canons which govern the activities of judges un-
connected to their own election or retention.40 Several other decisions and scholarly
articles have also approached questions under the judicial ethics code through the
framework of the public employee cases.41 It is to those cases that I now turn.
B. The Pickering/NTEU Test
The first modern case presenting a question about the constitutional rights of public
employees was United Public Workers v. Mitchell in 1947.42 In United Public Workers,
a union representing public employees challenged a provision of the Hatch Act that
prohibited civil service employees from taking “any active part in political manage-
ment or in political campaigns.”43 The Court gave tremendous deference to the gov-
ernment as an employer, stating that the justices would uphold regulation of any “act
reasonably deemed by Congress to interfere with the efficiency of the public service.”44
This very low threshold permitted Congress to regulate a wide variety of activities by
public employees in the name of ensuring integrity and efficiency in government,45
and was grounded in a vision of government employment as a privilege and a choice.
Justice Holmes memorably expressed this sentiment in a decision of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court: “The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics
may generally be restricted if done by public employees. See, e.g., United Pub. Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 102 (1947) (upholding the Hatch Act’s restrictions on free speech and
electioneering by federal employees). Because judges are public employees, the traditional
First Amendment analysis for free exercise claims, articulated in Employment Division v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876–82 (1990), does not apply.
40 Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 981, 985, 988 (7th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 619
F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2010) (analyzing the party affiliation clause under White, the endorsement
clause under Pickering, and the solicitation clause under Buckley v. Valeo); Bauer v. Shepard,
620 F.3d 704, 711 (7th Cir. 2010) (following Siefert by using Pickering to analyze a political
party leadership clause).
41 In re Hey, 452 S.E.2d 24, 30–31 (W. Va. 1994); In re Schenck, 870 P.2d 185, 204 (Or.
1994); Blue, supra note 31, at 10; Leonard E. Gross, Judicial Speech: Discipline and the
First Amendment, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1181, 1190 (1986); Leita Walker, Note, Protecting
Judges from White’s Aftermath: How the Public-Employee Speech Doctrine Might Help
Judges and the Courts in Which They Work, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 371 (2007).
42 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
43 Id. at 78 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 61(h)).
44 Id. at 101.
45 See Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (“If [public employees] do not
choose to work on such terms, they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and
go elsewhere.”); Paul M. Secunda, Neoformalism and the Reemergence of the Rights/
Privilege Distinction in Public Employment Law, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. _ (forthcoming
2011), available at http://works.bepress.com/paul_secunda/8; Note, Developments in the
Law—Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1738–56 (1984).
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but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”46 Just as an individual has a choice
whether to accept government employment, so too does the government has latitude
to manage its employees, including restricting their liberties when necessary.
The next major public employee case is Pickering v. Board of Education, which
concerned the rights of a teacher who wrote a letter to the editor of a local newspaper
criticizing the Board of Education’s budget allocations.47 The teacher was dismissed and
subsequently sued the Board. The Court concluded that the teacher’s First Amendment
rights had been violated, and announced a test to determine when such discipline is
unconstitutional: “The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the in-
terests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and
the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public ser-
vices it performs through its employees.”48 This case created a higher test than the
46 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
47 See Paul M. Secunda, The Story of Pickering v. Bd. of Education: Unconstitutional
Conditions and Public Employment, in RICHARD GARNETT & ANDREW KOPPELMAN, EDS.,
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW STORIES 6–11 (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=1567221.
48 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Embedded in this test is the particular requirement that the
speech must be about a “matter[ ] of public concern.” Id. When a court hears a challenge in
this area, it
must first determine whether the speech at issue can ‘be fairly charac-
terized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern,’ which is
defined as speech ‘relating to any matter of political, social, or other
concern to the community . . . .’ The ‘content, form, and context of a
given statement, as revealed by the whole record’ determines whether
an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern.
Marinoff v. City College of N.Y., 357 F. Supp. 2d 672, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Connick
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146–48 (1983)); see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418
(2006); Richard Hiers, Public Employees’ Free Speech: An Endangered Species of First
Amendment Rights in Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit Jurisprudence, 5 U. FLA. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 169, 202–07 (1993) (identifying some cases where the “matter of public concern”
test was either ignored or treated to a cursory review, but concluding that the test remains an
important part of the public employee jurisprudence); Edward L. Velazquez, Note, Waters v.
Churchill: Government-Employer Efficiency, Judicial Deference, and the Abandonment of
Public-Employee Free Speech by the Supreme Court, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1055, 1102–03
(1995) (reviewing Connick and other cases to conclude that the “matter of public concern” test
is a threshold that must be proven by the employee before the court reaches the balancing test).
But see Pengtian Ma, Public Employee Speech and Public Concern: A Critique of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Threshold Approach to Public Employee Speech Cases, 30 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 121 (1996).
In the case of speech concerning religious matters, the subject of this article, there can be
no doubt that it is a matter of public concern. Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470
F.3d 250, 257 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Scarbrough’s intended speech on his religious views . . . are
matters of public concern”); Tucker v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 1996)
(stating that religious speech is “obviously of public concern.”); cf. Latino Officers Ass’n.
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rational basis scrutiny (though the Court did not use that phrase) that characterized the
United Public Workers decision,49 and ended the era when the Court treated govern-
ment employment as purely a matter of privilege without any corresponding protection
for rights.50
Though there were several intervening public employee decisions, the next major
case for our purposes is United States v. National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU),
concerning the 1993 amendments to the Hatch Act.51 On behalf of its members, the
union challenged the Ethics in Government Act’s prohibition on federal employees’
receipt of honoraria for speeches and articles “largely unrelated to their Government
employment.”52 The Court distinguished this case from Pickering, which involved “a
post hoc analysis of one employee’s speech and its impact on that employee’s public
responsibilities.”53 In NTEU, by contrast, the Court dealt with “Congress’ [ex ante]
wholesale deterrent to a broad category of expression by a massive number of potential
speakers.”54 To deal with this sort of situation, the Court announced a new test:
[T]he Government’s burden is greater with respect to this statu-
tory restriction on expression than with respect to an isolated dis-
ciplinary action. The Government must show that the interests of
both potential audiences and a vast group of present and future
employees in a broad range of present and future expression are
v. New York, 196 F.3d 458, 466 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that participation in an ethnic pride
parade is a matter of public concern).
Finally, in a recent per curiam opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that the
“matter of public concern” test does not apply when the speech at issue was not connected
to the employee’s work, as in NTEU. San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80–82 (2004); see
Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 174 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Some courts, including both our
Court and the Supreme Court, have questioned the extent to which the public concern test
applies to off-duty speech on topics unrelated to employment.”). But see Piscottano v. Murphy,
No. 3:04CV682(MRK), 2005 WL 1424394, at *4–6 (D. Conn. June 9, 2005) (holding that
City of San Diego did not set aside the “matter of public concern” test for speech unconnected
to the employee’s work), aff’d, 511 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2007). Thus, though I am confident
courts would find that speech about religion “relat[es] to any matter of . . . social or other
concern to the community,” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1982), such an inquiry may
not be necessary if the public employee speaks in a private capacity.
49 Anthony T. Kovalchick, Ending the Suppression: Why the Hatch Act Cannot Withstand
Meaningful Constitutional Scrutiny, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 419, 431 (2008).
50 Paul M. Secunda, The Most Important Public Employment Law Case: Pickering v.
Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL FACULTY
BLOG (Oct. 25, 2010), http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2010/10/25/the-most-important
-public-employment-law-case-pickering-v-board-of-education-391-u-s-563-1968.
51 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
52 Id. at 466.
53 Id. at 466–67.
54 Id. at 467.
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outweighed by that expression’s ‘necessary impact on the actual
operation’ of the Government.55
One commentator characterized this as a “heavy burden of justification placed on
public employers[.]”56
This is the test that should be used to evaluate state judicial codes restricting
judges’ First Amendment rights to free speech, free association, and the free exercise
of religion.57 There are two key requirements to qualify for the higher scrutiny afforded
by NTEU. First, the case must arise from an ex ante broad-based rule or policy which
stifles speech or association of an entire class of employees; it cannot involve a post
hoc disciplinary decision in an individual case.58 Obviously, that criterion is met here;
each state code and the official interpretation of it is a policy promulgated to cover
all magistrates in that state.
Second, the public employees’ activities must be “largely unrelated to their
Government employment.”59 Here, all of the religious speech and association de-
scribed takes place outside the government workplace.60 Moreover, service on church
bodies or speeches at religious events need not involve opining on pending litigation
or legal issues. In fact, the Court has previously listed “sermons” alongside “fictional
writings, and athletic competitions”61 as types of “performances and writings that would
normally appear to have no nexus with an employee’s job.”62 Yet, some judicial ethics
55 Id. at 468 (quoting, in part, from Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571 (1968)).
56 Charles W. Hemingway, A Closer Look at Waters v. Churchill and United States v.
National Treasury Employees Union: Constitutional Tensions Between the Government as
Employer and the Citizen as Federal Employee, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 2231, 2267 (1995); see
NTEU, 513 U.S. at 466 (“The sweep of § 501(b) makes the Government’s burden heavy.”).
57 Though the public employee cases generally deal with free speech, they also provide the
appropriate mode of analysis for other First Amendment claims like free exercise and freedom
of association. Piscottano v. Murphy, 511 F.3d 247, 273–74 (2d Cir. 2007); Scarbrough v.
Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 260 (6th Cir. 2006); Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336
F.3d 185, 195–96 (2d Cir. 2003).
58 Though the ban in NTEU covered the entire federal workforce, it is not necessary for a
restriction to cover a workforce as large as the federal government’s for the NTEU analysis to
apply. Crue v. Aiken 370 F.3d 668, 684 (7th Cir. 2004); Swartzwelder v. McNeilly, 297 F.3d
228, 237 (3d Cir. 2002) (Alito, J.); Latino Officers Ass’n v. New York, 196 F.3d 458, 464
(2d Cir. 1999).
59 NTEU, 513 U.S. at 466; see also Roberts v. Ward, 468 F.3d 963, 968 (6th Cir. 2006)
(“Where the speech is unrelated to the job of the employee and involves a matter of public
concern, it appears to be entitled to greater protection, as it is less likely to disrupt the efficient
functioning of the workplace.”).
60 Different concerns apply for religious expression in the government workplace, and may
lead to a different determination. See Berry v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 645–46
(9th Cir. 2006).
61 NTEU, 513 U.S. at 476.
62 Id.
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policies prohibit judges from delivering sermons. It is to analyzing these restrictions
that I now turn.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON EXTRAJUDICIAL
INVOLVEMENT IN RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES
It should be said at the outset that many ethics advisory opinions appreciate the
important role that judges can play as community leaders through religious organi-
zations, and understand the desire of judges to serve their religious communities as
volunteers.63 As the U.S. Judicial Conference’s Committee on the Codes of Conduct 
63 See, e.g., Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, Op. 82-158 (1982), available at http://
www.alalinc.net/jic/opinions/ao82-158.htm (permitting a judge to serve on a church’s bond
committee); Ariz. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 96-13 (1996), available at http://
www.azcourts.gov/Portals/37/ethics_opinions/1996/96-13.pdf (permitting a judge to serve
as an usher in church); Ariz. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 93-01 (1993), available
at http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/37/ethics_opinions/1993/93-01.pdf (permitting a judge
to serve as an officer of a church or to “play a prominent role in a religious ceremony or
service”); Del. Judicial Proprieties Comm., Op. 1987-1 (1987), available at http://courts
.delaware.gov/jeac/opns/87-1.pdf (permitting a judge to serve as a trustee of a regional church
body and chairman of the administrative board of his congregation); Fla. Judicial Ethics
Advisory Comm., Op. 2009-12 (2009), available at http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity
/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/2009/2009-12.html (permitting a judge to serve on a
synagogue committee that permits reductions in membership dues); Fla. Judicial Ethics
Advisory Comm., Op. 2005-02 (2005), available at http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity
/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/2005/2005-02.html (permitting a judge to speak at a
Knights of Columbus dinner that would “break even” through tickets and sponsorships); Fla.
Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op. 97-26 (1997), available at http://
www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/ninet7/97-26.html
(permitting a judge to teach a leadership or a church law course at a religious university); Fla.
Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op. 85-11 (1985), available at http://
www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/eighty5/85-11.html
(permitting a judge to serve as National Youth Commissioner of B’Nai B’rith Youth); Ga.
Judicial Qualifications Comm’n, Op. 89 (1986) (permitting a judge to serve as an advisory
board member for a local unit of the Salvation Army); Ga. Judicial Qualifications Comm’n,
Op. 81 (1986) (permitting a judge to buy a ticket to attend a dinner of B’Nai B’rith); Ill.
Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 01-06 (2001), available at http://ija.org/ethicsop/opinions/01-06
.htm (permitting a judge to speak on parenting and family issues at a church service); Ill.
Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 96-7 (1996), available at http://ija.org/ethicsop/opinions/96-7
.htm (permitting a judge to serve on a parish school board); Ill. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 96-4
(1996), available at http://ija.org/ethicsop/opinions/96-4.htm (permitting a judge to serve as
the president of his synagogue); Kan. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. JE 112 (2003),
available at http://www.kscourts.org/pdf/ClerkCt/JE112.pdf (permitting a judge to volunteer
at a church-operated soup kitchen); Md. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 1980-10 (1980) , available
at http://mdcourts.gov/ethics/opinions/1980s/1980-10.pdf (permitting a judge to serve as a
vestryman [church council member] for his church); Md. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 1977-09
(1977), available at http://mdcourts.gov/ethics/opinions/1970s/1977-09.pdf (permitting a
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noted in the opinion quoted as the epigram to this article, judges can and should play
a vital role as leaders in their communities.64 However, numerous judicial ethics panels
place significant restrictions on the religious liberty of judges. Restrictions on extra-
judicial involvement in religious activities can generally be grouped into two categories:
restrictions based on the fund-raising clause, and restrictions based on concerns about
politics and partiality.65 Many of these restrictions cannot be sufficiently justified to
judge to serve as a trustee or officer of a religious foundation); Neb. Judicial Ethics Comm.,
Op. 05-3 (2005) available at http://supremecourt.ne.gov/professional-ethics/judges/ethics
-committee/pdf/05-3.pdf (permitting a judge to serve as a director of a non-profit religious
foundation); N.Y. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 09-146 (2009), available at http://www.nycourts
.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/09-146.htm (permitting a judge to belong to a religiously-
affiliated motorcycle club); N.Y. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 07-213 (2008), available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/07-213.htm (permitting a judge to display
a religious emblem on his car); N.Y. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 06-10 (2006), available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/06-10.htm (permitting a judge to serve as
parliamentarian for a religious organization); N.Y. Judicial Ethics Comm., Joint Op. 89-83,
89-84 (1989), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/89-83%20&
%2089-84.htm (permitting a judge to serve as an usher during a religious service); N.Y. Judicial
Ethics Comm., Op. 88-06 (1988), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics
/opinions/88-06.htm (permitting a judge to serve as chair of the regional chapter of a religious
“crusade”); Okla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 2007-4 (2007), available at http://www
.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=449053 (permitting a judge to serve
as president of the board of directors of a private Christian secondary school); S.C. Advisory
Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Op. 4-2008 (2008), available at http://www.judicial
.state.sc.us/advisoryOpinions/displayadvopin.cfm?advOpinNo=04-2008 (permitting a full-time
magistrate to also serve as a part-time church pastor); S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of
Judicial Conduct, Op. 28-2006 (2006), available at http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/advisory
Opinions/displayadvopin.cfm?advOpinNo=28-2006 (permitting a judge to serve as chairman
of the board of trustees of his church); Wash. Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 06-06 (2006),
available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/programs_orgs/pos_ethics/index.cfm?fa=pos_ethics
.dispopin&mode=0606 (permitting a judge to serve as an advisory committee member for a
Christian prayer breakfast); Wash. Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 93-29 (1993), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/programs_orgs/pos_ethics/index.cfm?fa=pos_ethics.dispopin&
mode=9329 (permitting a judge to serve on the church financial commission which examines
the church budget); Wis. Judicial Conduct Advisory Comm., Op. 99-2 (1999), available at
http://www.wicourts.gov/sc/judcond/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=883
(permitting a judge to perform in an ecumenical Easter theater production); Wis. Judicial
Conduct Advisory Comm., 98-8 (1998), available at http://www.wicourts.gov/sc
/judcond/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=891 (permitting judges to wear their
robes in church at a St. Thomas More Lawyers Society “Red Mass”); see also ABA Comm.
on Prof’l Responsibility and Ethics, Informal Op. 1070 (1969) (permitting a judge to serve
as chairman of a church board).
64 U.S. Judicial Conference Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Advisory Op. No. 80 (2009)
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct
/Vol02B-Ch02.pdf.
65 Some restrictions stemming from other provisions of the Code are legitimate. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 03-75 (2003), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip
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pass the constitutional scrutiny required by NTEU. In this Section of the Article, I
collect all of the rules and policies restricting religious activity by judges, and evaluate
whether they pass constitutional muster.66
A. The Fund-Raising Ban
The vast majority of the limits placed on judicial engagement in religious activity
stem from the ban on fund-raising activity. The ABA Model Code provides:
[A] judge may participate in activities sponsored by organiza-
tions or governmental entities concerned with the law, the legal
system, or the administration of justice, and those sponsored by
or on behalf of educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic
organizations not conducted for profit, including but not limited
to the following activities: . . .
(2) soliciting contributions for such an organization or entity, but
only from members of the judge’s family, or from judges over
whom the judge does not exercise supervisory or appellate
authority;
(3) soliciting membership for such an organization or entity, even
though the membership dues or fees generated may be used to
support the objectives of the organization or entity, but only if the
organization or entity is concerned with the law, the legal system,
or the administration of justice;
/judicialethics/opinions/03-75.htm (opining that a full-time judge should not serve on an advi-
sory panel of a religious order that reviews and considers procedures for handling allegations
of sexual misconduct by members of the order). The committee relied on the rule against
judges’ involvement in matters that may come before them in litigation and the rule against
lending the prestige of the judicial office to serve private interests. Id.; see also Ill. Judicial
Ethics Comm., Op. 96-16 (1996), available at http://ija.org/ethicsop/opinions/96-16.htm
(opining that a judge may not act as a rabbi’s advocate during contract negotiations between
the rabbi and the synagogue board, based on a rule against using the judge’s position to benefit
private interests and the rule against judges practicing law).
66 These rules rarely receive constitutional scrutiny because of the structure of the ethics
system. If a judge requests an advisory ethics opinion, it is always easiest for the panel to say
“no” and err on the side of a broad interpretation. Plus, these committees often have citizen
members and lack an adversarial process, so they are ill-equipped to resolve constitutional
questions. Yet there is no appeal mechanism; a disappointed judge’s only option is to go for-
ward with the activity. If the judicial discipline commission follows the advisory committee,
the judge can finally make his constitutional argument to the state’s high court which imposes
final discipline after an adversarial process. But this is a huge risk for the judge and still incurs
negative news stories and other ill effects. Consequently, very few judges challenge these rules
because of the high costs imposed by the current ethics structure.
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(4) appearing or speaking at, receiving an award or other recog-
nition at, being featured on the program of, and permitting his or
her title to be used in connection with an event of such an organi-
zation or entity, but if the event serves a fund-raising purpose, the
judge may participate only if the event concerns the law, the legal
system, or the administration of justice;
(5) making recommendations to such a public or private fund-
granting organization or entity in connection with its programs and
activities, but only if the organization or entity is concerned with
the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice; . . . .67
Most limits on judicial involvement in religious activities stem from these clauses,
although sometimes the “prestige of the judicial office” clause is also mentioned in
the same breath.68
The everyday effect of this ban is precisely what it says: judges are not permitted
to ask their fellow citizens, including their fellow believers, to support charitable and
religious causes. No ethics opinion is needed to explain that ban. Sometimes, how-
ever, judges pose questions that test the limits of the ban, and they consistently meet
rejection.69 For instance, when a Texas judge asked if he could solicit funds for a re-
ligious organization if he was not introduced as a judge, and if he did so outside the
67 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 3.7 (2007). To “personally solicit” is defined
elsewhere in the Code as “a direct request made by a judge or a judicial candidate for
financial support or in-kind services, whether made by letter, telephone, or any other means
of communication.” Id., Terminology.
68 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 1.3 (2007) (“A judge shall not abuse the prestige
of judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge or others . . .”).
69 See, e.g., Ark. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 94-03 (1994), available at http://
www.arkansas.gov/jeac/opinions/94_03.html (stating that a judge may not be a banquet speaker
at a church’s annual scholarship fund-raising dinner); Md. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 1975-03
(1975), available at http://mdcourts.gov/ethics/opinions/1970s/1975-03.pdf (stating that a judge
may not contribute to his temple’s “services auction”); Md. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 1975-01
(1975), available at http://mdcourts.gov/ethics/opinions/1970s/1975-01.pdf (stating that the
judge may not be the guest of honor at a fund-raising luncheon for a religious organization);
N.Y. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 89-11 (1989), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip
/judicialethics/opinions/89-11.htm (stating that a judge may not act as co-chairman of an annual
fund-raising dinner for a religious organization); Wash. Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 06-11
(2006), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/programs_orgs/pos_ethics/index.cfm?fa=pos
_ethics.dispopin&mode=0611 (stating that a judge may not, as a member of the board of
directors of a seminary, travel the state speaking to church members and parishes to raise
funds for the seminary); see also U.S. Judicial Conference Comm. on Codes of Conduct,
Advisory Op. 42 (2009) available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts
/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/Vol02B-Ch02.pdf (stating that a judge may not “tak[e] part in
the every-member canvass” of his church beyond making a personal contribution); ABA
Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 603 (1962) (stating that judges may
not engage in solicitation for charitable, philanthropic, civic, or ecclesiastical enterprises).
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territorial jurisdiction of his court, he was told no.70 A South Carolina judge asked if
he could write a letter “to encourage the congregation to pray for the church and its
stewardship mission and would not involve the direct solicitation of money.”71 The
Committee found that such a letter “is closely related to the solicitation of funds and
uses the prestige of the judge’s office to solicit funds.”72 Another South Carolina judge
asked whether she could appear in “a church video that encourages parishioners to
become active in the church and its fund-raising activities.”73 Again, the Committee
answered no, finding that “the person solicited will fell [sic] obligated to respond favor-
ably to the solicitor.”74 When judges in Georgia and Michigan asked if they could chair
fund-raising committees for their churches as long as they did not personally ask for
money, both were told no.75
At its most extreme, the ban is interpreted to prevent judges from holding positions
that traditionally, though not necessarily, involve fund-raising. Kansas does not allow
full-time judges to serve as part-time pastors, in part because “[i]nherent among the
duties of a pastor is participating in the financial affairs of his church.”76 In Maryland,
a judge was instructed not to serve as church treasurer because it “might well support
the notion that the prestige of the judicial office was being used to promote the financial
welfare of the church.”77 Finally, a Florida opinion barred a judge from serving as a
regional president, national youth commissioner, or vice chairman of the fund-raising
cabinet for a national Jewish organization, B’Nai B’rith.78 Although the judge said that
he would not personally solicit funds, the Committee felt he would “nonetheless be
appearing at fund-raising functions and lending the prestige of the judicial office to
70 Tex. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 165 (1993), available at http://www.courts.state.tx
.us/judethics/161-170.htm; see also McKoski, supra note 2, at 812 (citing two opinions that
judges may not solicit donations outside their jurisdictions).
71 S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Op. 16-1995 (1995), available
at http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/advisoryOpinions/displayadvopin.cfm?advOpinNo=16-1995.
72 Id.
73 S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Op. 26-2000 (2000), available
at http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/advisoryOpinions/displayadvopin.cfm?advOpinNo=26-2000.
74 Id.
75 Ga. Judicial Qualifications Comm’n, Op. 17 (1977); Mich. Judicial Tenure Comm.,
Op. CI-641 (1981), available at http://michbar.org/opinions/ethics/numbered_opinions
/ci-641.html.
76 Kan. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. JE-25 (1988), available at http://www
.kscourts.org/pdf/ClerkCt/JE25.pdf.
77 Md. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 1975-10 (1975), available at http://mdcourts.gov
/ethics/opinions/1970s/1975-10.pdf.
78 Fla. Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op. 85-4 (1985), available at
http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/eighty5/85-04.html.
But see Fla. Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op. 85-11 (1985), available
at http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity /LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/eighty5/85-
11.html (reversing the Committee’s previous position as to national youth commissioner after
receiving further information on the nature of the post).
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those activities.”79 A Texas judge encountered a similar rationale when he was denied
permission to serve on the development committee for a new parish school.80
In virtually all cases, the ban on solicitation is an unconstitutional restriction on
the religious liberty of judges for two main reasons: (1) the strict interpretation of the
rule does not serve the purposes behind the rule;81 and (2) permitting judges to fund-
raise for law-related, non-profit organizations or their own election campaigns, but
preventing them from fund-raising for other non-profits, does not stand up to scrutiny.
The ban on charitable solicitation arises from two reasonable concerns: “that poten-
tial donors either may be intimidated into making contributions when solicited by a
judge, or that they may expect future favors in return for their largesse.”82 However,
as the Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications has concluded, in practice, the
ban on charitable solicitation is “overly restrictive and unrelated to the dangers the
rule is meant to address.”83 This is also the considered judgment of the authors of the
leading treatise in this area:
The advisory opinions evince a strong consensus in favor of a strict
interpretation of the anti-solicitation rule . . . . In none of these or
dozens of similar cases, does there appear to be a realistic possi-
bility that the proposed activity actually would have exerted undue
influence over potential donors. A judge who appeared on a tele-
thon simply would have no way of knowing who had or hadn’t . . .
contributed to the cause; the same may be said of a national mail
campaign to erect a memorial to John Marshall. In both of these
instances the ‘solicitation’ would be made under circumstances
sufficiently anonymous as to preclude any hint of retribution or
reward. Conversely, in the church canvass and Boy Scout board
situation, the solicitations would have been made not to the gen-
eral public, but to a small number of like-minded people who had
79 See Fla. Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op. 85-4 (1985), avail-
able at http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/eighty5
/85-04.html.
80 Tex. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 25 (1977), available at http://www.courts.state.tx
.us/judethics/21-30.htm.
81 See Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 3233 v. Frenchtown Charter Twp., 246 F. Supp. 2d
734, 743 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (“[N]ot only does Frenchtown fail to show that its interests would
be compromised without its restrictions, but the poor fit between its restrictions and its asserted
interests put in doubt the justificatory force those interests provide for the restrictions.”).
82 STEVEN LUBET, BEYOND REPROACH: ETHICAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
ACTIVITIES OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES 29 (1984); see McKoski, supra note 2, at 781–82
nn.59–62 (collecting authorities). A tertiary concern is the public’s perception of the judiciary,
but this too is not served by a restrictive rule against fund-raising. Id. at 818.
83 Ind. Comm’n on Judicial Qualification, Op. 1-96 (1996).
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already indicated their willingness to support the particular cause.
These are not situations in which the judicial office is likely to play
a determining role in the decision to contribute, but solicitation was
nonetheless considered improper.84
As this passage indicates, the anti-solicitation rule has been consistently applied in cir-
cumstances where the concerns that motivated the rule’s passage are not operative.85
Judge Jeff Sutton’s statement for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
regarding a ban on personal campaign fund-raising by judges, rings just as true for
charitable fund-raising:
[T]he canon prohibits a range of other solicitations, including
speeches to large groups and signed mass mailings. Such indirect
methods of solicitation present little or no risk of undue pressure
or the appearance of a quid pro quo. No one could reasonably be-
lieve that a failure to respond to a signed mass mailing asking for
donations would result in unfair treatment in future dealings with
the judge. Nor would a speech requesting donations from a large
gathering have a ‘coercive effect’ on reasonable attendees.86
Though it is certainly the prerogative of legislative bodies to pass laws that are some-
times overinclusive, as a general matter, they may not pass laws whose overinclusivity
infringes on constitutional rights.87
Just as the rule is overinclusive by banning speech that is unconnected to the con-
cerns that motivate the rule, the code is underinclusive because it permits other types
of fund-raising.88 Judges are allowed to engage in more fund-raising for law-related
organizations than they are for other types of charities, including religious ones.89
84 JAMES ALFINI ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 9.04A (4th ed. 2007).
85 See McKoski, supra note 2, at 792 (“Overall, however, the new Code persists in retaining
fund-raising restrictions that do not advance the state’s interest in preventing the collateral
misuse of judicial power and prestige.”).
86 Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 205 (6th Cir. 2010).
87 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending
Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2422 (1996) (“No Overinclusiveness: A law is not
narrowly tailored if it restricts a significant amount of speech that doesn’t implicate the govern-
ment interest. The theory here is that if the government can serve the interest while burdening
less speech, it should.”) (emphasis omitted) (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 120–21 (1991); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative
Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 500–01 (1985); First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 794 (1978)).
88 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 3.7 (2007).
89 Id.; see Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, Op. 09-899 (2009), available at http://www
.alalinc.net/jic/opinions/ao09-899.htm (permitting a judge to donate art to a State Bar auction);
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Moreover, state judges who are elected are also permitted to raise funds for their cam-
paigns, either directly or through campaign committees.90
Compared to the 1990 Code, the 2007 ABA Model Rules “dramatically enlarg[ed]
the permissible scope of a judge’s role in fund-raising activities sponsored by law-
related groups.”91 At the same time, however, the 2007 Rules impose greater restric-
tions on judges’ ability to support non-legal non-profit organizations: “[T]he 1990
Code permitted a judge to solicit non-judges to join law-related and non–law-related
groups so long as the solicitation was not coercive, not primarily a fund-raising mech-
anism, and the person solicited was not likely to appear before the judge.”92 Under
the 2007 Rules, however, judges are allowed to recruit new members to only law-
related organizations.93
The Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission, summarizing the Reporters’ Notes
to the 2009 code, argues that
a judge’s solicitation of membership in law-related organizations,
such as a bar association, would be perceived by the public as more
natural or more appropriate than solicitation of membership in
nonlaw-related organizations, such as an opera society or a charity;
only in the latter context does the judge’s solicitation constitute
coercion and an abuse of the prestige of the office[.]94
This statement does not explain why a judge’s solicitation of membership in the bar
association is any less coercive than membership in an opera society. In fact, it may
be more coercive, because lawyers and law firms are far more likely to appear before
the judge than the judge’s friends and neighbors.95 Second, it ignores the fact that bar
Nev. Standing Comm. on Judicial Ethics and Election Practices, Amended Op. JE00-004
(2000), available at http://judicial.state.nv.us/je000043new.htm (stating that the Nevada Code
“has been amended to allow a judge to assist a law-related organization in fund-raising”).
90 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 4.4 (2007).
91 McKoski, supra note 2, at 794.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, Op. 09-899 (2009), available at http://www.alalinc.net/jic
/opinions/ao09-899.htm (summarizing CHARLES E. GEYH & W. WILLIAM HODES, REPORTERS’
NOTES TO THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 69–70 (2009)).
95 McKoski, supra note 2, at 819:
The first task in assessing the legitimacy of the distinction between law-
related and all other types of charitable fund-raisers is to determine in
which type of event it is more likely that a judge could—in actuality or
in perception—misuse the prestige of judicial office, to intimidate, co-
erce, or influence a potential donor. Is it a bar association or other law-
related gathering where the targeted donors are often almost exclusively
attorneys, many of whom have appeared or may appear before the judge?
Or is it the event of an organization like a church, college, or cause-driven
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associations often take very controversial positions on matters of public policy, such
as the right to abortion, the right to same-sex marriage, and the war on terror.96 Solicit-
ing attorneys to join a bar association that takes strong and divisive stands on such
matters may be more of an abuse of the prestige of the judicial office than soliciting
a friend or neighbor to join a cultural organization, like the opera.97
In addition to permitting judges to solicit memberships for law-related organi-
zations, the Code also permits a judge’s campaign committee to raise money to bene-
fit the judge’s campaign.98 Though the rules bar the judge from making a personal
appeal for funds, this current system is under significant attack because it does not
achieve the two motivations of such rules.99 First, most lay people do not distinguish
between the judge’s campaign committee and the judge.100 Second, the judge can find
out who is supporting his campaign by reading the committee’s campaign finance
charity where few potential ticket purchasers are lawyers and most con-
tributors have very little likelihood of coming before the judge? Of course,
the greatest pressure is on attorneys whose livelihood may depend on
their success in court.
96 Dennis Jacobs, The Secret Life of Judges, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2855, 2860 (2007)
(“[B]ar groups are highly political. The ABA has formally adopted and announced hundreds
of positions on virtually every issue in political dispute.”); Josh Gerstein, Right Sees Law
Group Tilting Left, POLITICO (Sept. 25, 2010 6:14 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories
/0910/42709.html (reporting that the ABA adopted a position in favor of same-sex marriage and
filed an amicus brief in opposition to Arizona’s immigration law); cf. U.S. Judicial Conference
Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Advisory Op. No. 82 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts
.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/Vol02B-Ch02.pdf (“The judge
should not join an organization if the judge perceives there is any other ethical obligation that
would preclude such membership. For example, if the organization takes public positions on
controversial topics, association with the group might raise a reasonable question regarding
the judge’s impartiality.”).
97 Incidentally, federal judges are permitted by the Code of Conduct for U.S. judges to
solicit memberships (but not funds) for non-profit organizations whether or not they are related
to the law. U.S. Judicial Conference Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Advisory Op. 35 (2009),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct
/Vol02B-Ch02.pdf, citing Canon 4C (“A judge should not personally participate in a member-
ship solicitation if the solicitation might reasonably be perceived as coercive or is essentially
a fund-raising mechanism.”). Moreover, several states do not make a distinction between legal
and non-legal groups in permitting judges to speak or receive awards from a non-profit at a
fund-raising dinner. McKoski, supra note 2, at 820 (citing rules in California, Illinois, Indiana,
Ohio, and Texas).
98 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 4.4 (2007) (regarding campaign committees);
id. at R. 4.1(A)(8) (2007) (barring judges from personally soliciting contributions to support
their campaign committees).
99 See LUBET, supra note 82; McKoski, supra note 2, at 781–82 (identifying the two
motives).
100 McKoski, supra note 2, at 772, (citing Charles F. Scott, Reconciling Conflicts in
Illinois Judicial Ethics, 19 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1067, 1072 (1987)).
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reports, and donors may give assuming the judge reads his committee’s reports.101
Increasingly, judges are permitted to directly solicit campaign funds.102 If judges can
personally recruit members for law-related organizations and can personally raise
funds for their campaigns, then they should also be able to recruit members and raise
funds for charitable causes.103
Finally, it may be that reform of the solicitation rules would lead to greater public
confidence in the judiciary. People respect judges when they see them involved in the
community, supporting worthy causes. If judges are allowed to take a more active part
in the religious life of their communities, it may result in a higher level of esteem for
judges as leaders who care about people.
Because this current broad ban on solicitation infringes on the constitutional rights
of judges, it prompts the obvious question: what should the rule be instead? I suggest
101 Richard Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes after Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 181, 226–27 (2004).
102 This is due, in large part, to court decisions stating that they have a constitutional right to
do so. See Wersal v. Sexton, 613 F.3d 821, 838–41 (8th Cir. 2010) (striking down Minnesota’s
solicitation clause, which was amended following the 2005 en banc White II decision); Carey
v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 204–07 (6th Cir. 2010); Republican Party of Minn. v. White,
416 F.3d 738, 763–66 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1322–23
(11th Cir. 2002); Yost v. Stout, No. 06-4122-JAR, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107557, at * 36–37
(D. Kan., Nov. 16, 2008), appeal dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, 607 F.3d 1239 (10th
Cir. 2010); see also Siefert v. Alexander, 597 F. Supp. 2d 860, 886–89 (W.D. Wis. 2009),
rev’d, 608 F.3d 974, 988–90 (7th Cir. 2010) (district court struck down a solicitation clause);
N.C. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7B(4), available at http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS
/Councils/JudicialStandards/Documents/Amendments-NCJudicialCode.pdf (2004) (permitting
personal solicitation); Mark Spottswood, Free Speech and Due Process Problems in the
Regulation and Financing of Judicial Election Campaigns, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 331, 350–53
(2007) (arguing that bans on personal solicitation are unconstitutional); Nat Stern, The Looming
Collapse of Restrictions on Judicial Campaign Speech, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 63, 128–29
(2008) (same). But see Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 709–10 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholding a
solicitation clause); Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 988–90 (7th Cir. 2010); Republican
Party of Minn. v. White, 361 F.3d 1035, 1048–49 (8th Cir. 2004), rev’d en banc, 416 F.3d 738,
763–66 (8th Cir. 2005) (panel opinion upheld solicitation clause); Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd.
of the Sup. Ct. of Pa., 944 F.2d 137, 144–46 (3d Cir. 1991) (upholding a solicitation clause pre-
White I); Winnig v. Sellen, No. 10-cv-362-wmc, 2010 WL 4116977 at *3 (W.D.Wis., Oct. 19,
2010); In re Dunleavy, 838 A.2d 338, 349–51 (Me. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 960 (2004);
In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31, 41–44 (Or. 1990); Alexandrea Haskell Young, Note, The First
Chink in the Armor? The Constitutionality of State Laws Burdening Judicial Candidates after
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 433, 476–78 (2004) (arguing that
a solicitation clause is constitutional).
103 Admittedly, campaign fund-raising is subject to strict scrutiny under White, while chari-
table fund-raising is subject to the test from NTEU. See supra text accompanying notes 55–62.
However, as I explain later, the NTEU test sets a heavy burden for the government. See infra
text accompanying notes 185–96. In fact, one circuit has characterized NTEU as setting a strict
scrutiny test. Crue v. Aiken, 370 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2004). Moreover, campaign fund-raising
is much more likely than charitable fund-raising to undermine the public’s confidence in the
judiciary because it benefits the judge personally rather than the community-at-large.
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that another provision of the ABA’s Model Code provides a good starting point.104 The
ABA Model Code allows judges to accept a number of gifts without reporting such
acceptance, from items with little intrinsic value to books and journals provided on a
complimentary basis.105 The Rules also permit judges to accept “gifts, loans, bequest,
benefits, or other things of value, if the source is a party or other person, including
a lawyer, who has come or is likely to come before the judge, or whose interests have
come or are likely to come before the judge.”106 In such cases, judges are required
annually to publicly report these gifts to the clerk of the court.107
A similar formulation could work well in the charitable solicitation realm. Judges
could engage in personal solicitation of charitable contributions from any person or
entity that is not before, or is not likely to come before, the judge, or whose interests
are not before, or are not likely to come before, the judge. Such a limit, if preceded
by a general admonition against soliciting charitable contributions in a manner that
undermines the integrity or public reputation of the judiciary, would achieve the two
goals of the rule while allowing judges freedom to otherwise act as leaders in their
communities. It would, in other words, “give the members of the judiciary every rea-
sonable degree of latitude, barring activities only where they do measurable damage
to the Court’s dignity . . . or appearance of impartiality.”108
B. Politics and Partiality
Though the rule regarding fund-raising solicitation and abuse of the judicial office
is the primary source of limitations on judicial religious activity, other rules have also
been interpreted to limit a judge’s opportunities to live out his faith.109 This Section
104 Here, I am picking up on an observation made by Judge McKoski. See McKoski, supra
note 2, at 773 n.21 (contrasting the Model Code rule on gifts with the rule on charitable
solicitation).
105 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 3.13(B) (2007).
106 Id. at R. 3.13(C)(3). Judicial reception of gifts is still limited by a general ban on gifts
which “would appear to a reasonable person to undermine the judge’s independence, integrity,
or impartiality.” Id. at R. 3.13(A).
107 Id. at R. 3.15.
108 ALFINI, ET AL., supra note 84, at § 10.03D. Another way to deal with this could be a
dollar amount threshold for fund-raising, equivalent to the contribution limit for statewide
judicial office for instance.
109 For instance, Maryland initially barred judges from serving as officers in ecclesiastical
proceedings, such as annulments of marriage under canon law. Md. Judicial Ethics Comm.,
Op. 1986-08 (1986) (citing Md. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 1973-08 (1973)), available at
http://www.courts.state.md.us/ethics/opinions/1980s/1986-08.pdf. More than a decade later,
that opinion was withdrawn, and Maryland now permits its judges to engage in an “ecclesiastic
proceeding [because it] is totally independent of the civil proceeding” for divorce. Md. Judicial
Ethics Comm., Op. 1986-08 (1986), available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/ethics/opinions
/1980s/1986-08.pdf. The only other opinion on the matter has also concluded that judges may
participate in proceedings under ecclesiastical law. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, Op. 91-412
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focuses on two areas of judicial ethics that have justified limits on religious activity
in the past: politics and partiality.
One line that all state judges must tread carefully lies between the judicial role
and partisan politics and public issues.110 Some state judges are appointed on a theo-
retically non-partisan merit basis, while others are elected statewide on a non-partisan
or partisan ballot.111 Yet given this reality, judicial ethics codes generally prohibit
judges from engaging in “political or campaign activity that is inconsistent with the
independence, integrity, or impartiality of the judiciary.”112 This has been extended to
also limit the ability of judges to speak publicly on issues under judicial consideration;
a judge shall not, “in connection with cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to
come before the court, make pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsistent
with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office.”113
Some judicial ethics opinions have cautioned judges against involvement in reli-
gious organizations that also take positions on public policy issues.114 An opinion of
the Delaware Judicial Ethics Committee, for instance, permitted a judge to serve as a
church trustee, but “cautioned [judges] about service on boards of organizations which
may make policy decisions that could have political significance or imply commit-
ment to causes that may come before the courts for adjudication.”115 Similarly, the
(1991), available at http://www.alalinc.net/jic/opinions/ao91-412.htm (finding that a judge’s
service on the Synod Permanent Judicial Committee of the Presbyterian Church (USA) is
permitted because the Committee does not “concern any secular legal issues”).
110 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 4 (2007).
111 See Initial Selection: Courts of Last Resort, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, http://
www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/LastResort_1196092722031.pdf (last visited
Oct. 10, 2011).
112 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 4 (2007).
113 Id. at R. 4.1(13).
114 See U.S. Judicial Conference Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Op. 2 (2009), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/Vol02B-Ch02
.pdf (“The judge should not serve on the board of a nonprofit organization if the judge per-
ceives there is any other ethical obligation that would preclude such service. For example,
if the organization takes public positions on controversial topics, association with the group
might raise a reasonable question regarding the judge’s impartiality.”); U.S. Judicial Conference
Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Op. 82 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx
?doc=/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/Vol02B-Ch02.pdf (referring to membership in such
organizations); Va. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 08-1 (2008) (withdrawn, Feb. 17,
2010), available at http://worldcat.org/arcviewer/2/LEGAL/2009/12/15/H1260908502256
/viewer/file1.html (“Religious organizations are far different from other organizations in which
judges might become involved, such as neighborhood associations, softball leagues or youth
organizations, in the sense that many religious organizations either publicly expound upon,
or are publicly associated with, certain positions on controversial issues. . . . Those issues
may include, for example, abortion, appropriate child placement environment, and criminal
sentencing considerations.”).
115 Del. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 1987-1 (1987), available at http://courts.delaware.gov
/jeac/opns/87-1.pdf.
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New York committee permitted a judge to serve as an officer of the Jewish Attorneys
Society, but the members reminded the judge of the code provision requiring him to
“regulate his extra-judicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict with his judicial
duties, especially those relating to political or quasi-political activities or issues.”116 In
an opinion for the Florida advisory committee, two members sua sponte cautioned a
judge who was active in the Jewish organization B’Nai B’rith that there was a poten-
tial problem with “possible political implications of your activities.”117 In two addi-
tional Florida cases concerning B’Nai B’rith, a concurring and a dissenting opinion
argued that the judges should decline leadership positions in the organization due to
its political activities.118 A Pennsylvania opinion stated that a judge could not be an
officer in a religious organization that issued a public statement opposing abortion.119
The opinion further stated that the judge could only be a member of the organization
by having the public statement list those who agreed, excluding the judge, or list the
judge as having not participated in the decision to make the statement.120 Likewise,
an Illinois opinion stated that a judge could not serve as president of a prison min-
istry organization because it “takes a clear political stand by opposing the death pen-
alty and demonstrating against its imposition by holding prayer vigils.”121 One of the
committee’s rationales was that “judges swear they shall uphold state laws,” and that
demonstrating or speaking against the death penalty law “would breach . . . the Code
of Judicial Conduct, which requires a judge to ‘respect and comply with the law’ and
act ‘at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.’”122 Under this reasoning, judges would be barred from
leading any organization, religious or not, which publicly supports any change to
existing state law.
116 N.Y. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 88-18 (1988), available at http://www.nycourts.gov
/ip/judicialethics/opinions/88-18.htm.
117 Fla. Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op. 85/11 (1985), available at
http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/eighty5/85-11.html.
118 One Florida opinion concerned a judge who wished to serve as chairman of the Anti-
Defamation League of B’Nai B’rith’s Florida regional board. One member dissented because
he believed the ADL “has a national image for political activism.” Fla. Comm. on Standards
of Conduct Governing Judges, Op. 75-26 (1975), available at http://www.jud6.org/Legal
Community/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/svnt5/75-26.html. The second Florida opinion
concerned a judge who wished to serve as Southeastern U.S. regional president of B’Nai B’rith.
One member of the ethics panel opined that the judge should decline to serve “based on the
difficulty of separating your distinguished status as judge from the . . . political activities of
that organization.” Fla. Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op. 85-4 (1985),
available at http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/eighty5
/85-04.html.
119 Pa. Judicial Ethics Comm., Informal Op. 12/3/99 (1999).
120 Id.
121 Ill. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 93-7 (1993), available at http://www.ija.org/ethicsop
/opinions/93-7.htm.
122 Id.
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Though these sorts of concerns have been limited thus far to a few states, the
potential impact of such an interpretation could be significant. Many churches are
active where religious and moral convictions intersect with public policy, from peace
and poverty to abortion and marriage. This sort of position-taking by churches is pro-
tected speech and free exercise under the First Amendment.123 Thus, if the ethics rules
prohibit judges from being members of churches or denominations that take posi-
tions on public policy, virtually every church in America would be off-limits.
Before reaching the constitutional issue, the first question to ask in these in-
stances is whether the judges have actually violated the ethics rules or whether “the
ethics establishment” has interpreted the rules more broadly than the text justifies.124
Canon 4 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits “political or campaign
activity that is inconsistent with the independence, integrity, or impartiality of the
judiciary.”125 That canon, however, is not legally binding; it is merely an “overarching
principle” that should guide interpretation of the rules.126 There is a binding rule against
being a “leader” or “hold[ing] an office” in a “political organization.”127 A “political
organization” is defined by the Code as “a political party or other group sponsored by
or affiliated with a political party or candidate, the principal purpose of which is to fur-
ther the election or appointment of candidates for political office.”128 None of the orga-
nizations discussed in the judicial ethics opinions above are “political organizations”
under this definition.
Thus, other than general admonition against the appearance of impropriety, all that
is left is the rule that “a judge . . . shall not . . . in connection with cases, controversies,
or issues that are likely to come before the court, make pledges, promises, or commit-
ments that are inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties
of judicial office.”129 If this rule is constitutional,130 then it is only so when narrowly
123 Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1969) (“Adherents of particular faiths
and individual churches frequently take strong positions on public issues including, as this case
reveals in the several briefs amici, vigorous advocacy of legal or constitutional positions. Of
course, churches as much as secular bodies and private citizens have that right.”).
124 The phrase “the ethics establishment” and the idea of an overzealous, self-righteous, and
often self-appointed class of ethics enforcers comes from PETER W. MORGAN & GLENN H.
REYNOLDS, THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY: HOW THE ETHICS WARS HAVE UNDERMINED
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY (1997).
125 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 4 (2007).
126 Id. at Scope [2].
127 Id. at R. 4.1(A)(1).
128 Id. at Terminology.
129 Id. at R. 4.1(A)(13).
130 Two federal district courts believe it is not. N.D. Family Alliance v. Bader, 361 F. Supp.
2d 1021, 1044 (D.N.D. 2005); Family Trust Found. of Ky. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672,
711 (E.D. Ky. 2004); see also In re Hey, 452 S.E.2d 24, 33 (W.Va. 1994) (“It is difficult to
comprehend how truthful remarks or statements of opinion by a judge about a matter . . .
unrelated to a matter before him, or likely to come before him, and which is not otherwise
specifically prohibited can ever create the appearance of impropriety.”).
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construed.131 Certainly, there are some instances where a judge’s participation in a
religious organization may commit him on an issue, for instance, if a state deputy of
the Knights of Columbus were quoted in a press release on the anniversary of Roe v.
Wade. Even then, though, such a commitment may not be “inconsistent with the im-
partial performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office.”132 In cases where such
a judge could feel that he would be violating the rule, in virtually every instance there
is an accommodation that would allow the judge to hold the post without committing
a violation. To continue my example, this could be achieved by having a different state-
wide officer of the Knights of Columbus quoted in the press release.133 Such a case-by-
case accommodation is far preferable to having an ethics board force the judge out of
the leadership post entirely.
Another way that judges’ activity may be limited is a ruling that the judge’s reli-
gious affiliation or activity may give the appearance of partiality towards litigants.
Only one opinion, from the Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel of Kansas, has drawn on
this rationale to limit a judge’s religious activities.134 A candidate for magistrate judge
asked whether he may be the “regularly employed weekend pastor of a church.”135 In
that position, he would preach on weekends and perform occasional pastoral duties,
such as visiting hospitalized parishioners.136 The panel decided that the magistrate could
not serve as a weekend minister for three primary reasons.137 The panel members’ first
reason for that decision was based on the fear that “the appearance to a litigant or
lawyer member of a denomination other than that of the minister-judge could well
131 Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 715 (7th Cir. 2010); Pa. Family Inst. v. Celluci, 521
F. Supp. 2d 351, 372 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Duwe v. Alexander, 490 F. Supp. 2d 968, 975 (W.D.
Wis. 2007).
132 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 4.1(A)(13) (2007). By comparison, judges
announce how they would rule in future cases in opinions from time to time. See, e.g., Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 944 (1992) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) (“We believe that Roe was wrongly decided, and that it can and should be
overruled consistently with our traditional approach to stare decisis in constitutional cases.”);
see also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 777–78 (2002) (“A judge’s lack
of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a case has never been thought a neces-
sary component of equal justice, and with good reason. For one thing, it is virtually impossible
to find a judge who does not have preconceptions about the law. . . . Indeed, even if it were
possible to select judges who did not have preconceived views on legal issues, it would hardly
be desirable to do so.”).
133 See Ill. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 96-4 (1996), available at http://ija.org/ethicsop
/opinions/96-4.htm (permitting a judge to serve as president of a church, temple, or mosque,
provided that another member of the church will make the request for donations even though
that is traditionally the job of the president).
134 Kan. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. JE-25 (1988), available at http://www.kscourts
.org/pdf/ClerkCt/JE25.pdf.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
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create a feeling of being disadvantaged.”138 On these and other grounds,139 the panel
denied the judge’s request.140 This opinion is an outlier among the relevant opinions,
as only one other opinion has cautioned judges against religious activity based on the
appearance of partiality towards members of the judge’s church or against those who
do not belong to the judge’s church.141 An extensive literature has discussed the duty
138 Id.
139 The panel gave two additional reasons. First, “[i]nherent [in] the duties of a pastor is partic-
ipating in the financial affairs of his church,” and this would collide with the ban on solicitation.
Id. Second, they felt that there would be an “inevitable” conflict for “time and loyalty” between
“his duties as a pastor and his duties as a judge.” Id. Setting aside the arguments given above
against application of the solicitation ban, a church can arrange its internal affairs so that
members and leaders other than the pastor/judge can discuss stewardship and request tithes
and offerings. See Ill. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 96-4 (1996) (permitting a judge to serve
as president of a church, temple, or mosque, provided that another member of the church will
make the request for donations even though that is traditionally the job of the president).
Moreover, it is not inevitable that there will be a conflict over the judge’s time—plenty of
judges engage in a wide variety of weekend activities without neglecting their judicial day
job. The committee should have allowed the judge to go forward with his weekend activities,
and his fellow judges, or others, could raise the question if it, in fact, began to interfere with
his day job. See S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Op. 4-2008 (2008),
available at http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/advisoryOpinions/displayadvopin.cfm?advOpinNo=
04-2008 (permitting a full-time magistrate to serve as a part-time pastor, so long as it does not
“require significant time away from the magistrate’s judicial duties”).
140 Kan. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. JE-25 (1988), available at http://www.kscourts
.org/pdf/ClerkCt/JE25.pdf.
141 Wis. Judicial Conduct Advisory Comm., Op. 99-2 (1999), available at http://www
.wicourts.gov/sc/judcond/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=883 (“The committee
recognizes that the judge’s participation in a Christian oriented production may be seen as indica-
tive of bias or prejudice on religious issues. This is a factor that a judge should carefully consider
before engaging in religious oriented conduct that may be observed by the public.”). One addi-
tional opinion that has since been withdrawn also took this tack. Va. Judicial Ethics Advisory
Comm., Op. 08-1 (2008) (withdrawn, Feb. 17, 2010) (“[T]he judge scrupulously [should] avoid
situations . . . that create the reasonable impression that the judge will be less than totally im-
partial when dealing with anyone who might appear before him in a judicial capacity, no matter
that person’s religious affiliation or lack thereof.”). Were it not withdrawn, this Virginia opinion
would replace the Kansas opinion as the extreme outlier for restrictions on the religious liberty
of judges. It prohibits the judge from serving as a speaker or guest of honor at a religious ser-
vice that takes a special collection for the building fund or calls for participants “to pledge
future contributions of a certain level,” as is done on an annual “Stewardship Sunday” when
tithing is discussed. Id. It cautions judges against giving public testimony that urges a large
gathering “‘to become a Christian or a member of a particular local church body’” Id. (quoting
the opinion request). It prohibits a judge from acting as a pastor or minister at a regular church
service, and it contains general words of caution against any public activity that may “create
the reasonable impression that the judge will be less than totally impartial.” Id. The opinion was
adopted on a 5-4 vote by the Committee, and was withdrawn less than two years after its
issuance. Id. According to the Committee’s web page, the members are “considering whether
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of judges to set aside religious sentiments on the bench,142 and though this usually
focuses on the issues contested in a case, it also includes the religious affiliations of
the parties before the judge.143
In addition to these explicitly religious cases, the intersection of the Boy Scouts of
America with the judicial ethics establishment provides a cautionary tale to churches
about the way these clauses can be used. Generally, judicial membership in organi-
zations is governed by Rule 3.6 of the ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which
provides, “[a] judge shall not hold membership in any organization that practices
invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, gender, religion, national origin,
ethnicity, or sexual orientation.”144 The Commentary to the Rule specifically states
that “[a] judge’s membership in a religious organization as a lawful exercise of the
freedom of religion is not a violation of this Rule.”145 Based on this specific exemption,
one would normally conclude that judges may fully participate in religious organiza-
tions that reserve leadership positions for only men, or that condemn homosexuality on
moral grounds and refuse to extend leadership positions or marriage rites to actively
homosexual persons.
This guarantee in the Commentary, however, may not be sufficient protection, as
the Boy Scouts have learned the hard way. Just as religious organizations have a spe-
cific exemption, no ethics opinion has found that the Boy Scouts engage in invidious
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.146 Two opinions, however, have gone
to issue a revised opinion.” Va. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm. Ops., available at http://www
.courts.state.va.us/agencies/jirc/opinions.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2011).
142 See, e.g., Scott Idleman, Private Conscience, Public Duties: The Unavoidable Conflicts
Facing a Catholic Judge, 4 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 312, 313 nn.5–6 (2006) (citing articles
discussing faith and judicial duty); Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Must a Faithful Judge Be a
Faithless Judge?, 4 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 157, 158 (2006); Antonin Scalia, God’s Justice and
Ours, FIRST THINGS (May 2002), available at http://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/01/gods
-justice-and-ours-32.
143 See e.g., Carl Zollman, Religious Liberty in the American Law, II., 17 MICH. L. REV.
456, 463 (1919).
144 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 3.6 (A) (2007).
145 Id. at R. 3.6 Comment [4].
146 Ariz. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 00-05 (2000), available at http://www
.azcourts.gov/portals/37/ethics_opinions/2000/00-05-A.pdf (stating that involvement in the
Boy Scouts is not proscribed by the invidious discrimination clause); Ariz. Judicial Ethics
Advisory Comm., Op. 94-07 (1994), available at http://www.azcourts.gov/portals/37/ethics
_opinions/1994/94-07.pdf; Del. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2006-4 (2006), available
at http://courts.delaware.gov/jeac/opns/06-4.pdf; Ind. Comm’n on Judicial Qualifications,
Op. 1-94 (1994), available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/jud-qual/docs/adops/1-94.pdf;
Mass. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 01-1 (2001), available at http://www.mass.gov/courts
/sjc/cje/2001-1h.html; Wash. Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 04-01 (2004), available at http://
www.courts.wa.gov/programs_orgs/pos_ethics/index. Texas’ code does not have an invidious
discrimination clause, but its ethics committee has held that membership in the Boy Scouts
does not violate its impartiality clause. See Tex. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 158 (1993),
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one step further, distinguishing membership in the Boy Scouts (governed by the
invidious discrimination clause) and leadership (governed by the catch-all judicial
impartiality clauses147).148 These opinions have barred judges from holding certain
leadership positions in the Boy Scouts. Additionally, several authorities have said that
mere membership, though not barred by the invidious discrimination clause, may
require recusal in certain cases under the impartiality clause.149 The distinction be-
tween leadership and membership and the use of recusal may be exploited in the
future to limit the religious liberty of judges.
available at http://www.courts.state.tx.us/judethics/ISH60htmcfm?fa=pos_ethics_dispopin
&mode=0401. But see Leslie W. Abramson, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 79
MARQ. L. REV. 949, 987–88 (1996) (suggesting that the Boy Scouts may operate in violation
of the Code as to gender); Jeff Bleich, Fairness required on and off Bench, CAL. BAR J. (March
2003), available at http://archive.calbar.ca.gov//Archive.aspx?articleId=46230&categoryId=
41219&month=3&year=2003 (stating that the Boy Scouts operate in violation of the invidious
discrimination clause); cf. Ariz. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 94-13 (1994), available
at http://www.azcourts.gov/portals/37/ethics_opinions/1994/94-13.pdf (stating that the com-
mittee was not presented with sufficient information to determine if the Tucson Arizona Boys
Chorus or the Junior League of Tucson engaged in invidious discrimination in violation of the
Code); Vt. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 2 (1997), available at http://www.vermontjudiciary
.org/JC/SharedDocuments/Opinion2.pdf (stating that the committee was not presented with
sufficient information to determine if the Boy Scouts engaged in invidious discrimination in
violation of the Code).
147 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 1.2 (2007) (“A judge shall act at all times in
a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of
the judiciary.”); id. at R. 3.1(C) (“[W]hen engaging in extrajudicial activities, a judge shall
not . . . participate in activities that would appear to a reasonable person to undermine the
judge’s independence, integrity, or impartiality.”).
148 Del. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2006-4 (2006), available at http://courts
.delaware.gov/jeac/opns/06-4.pdf; Wash. Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 04-01 (2004), available
at http://www.courts.wa.gov/programs_orgs/pos_ethics/index.cfm?fa=pos_ethics.dispopin
&mode=0401. But see Mass. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 2001-1 (2001), available at http://
www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/cje/2001-1h.html (stating that BSA membership is not barred by
the invidious discrimination clause, and refusing to go “beyond our mandate to interpret
another section of the Code of Judicial Conduct [namely, the impartiality clause] to mandate
what the Court itself quite deliberately appears to have chosen not to do” when it did not list
sexual orientation as a protected category in the invidious discrimination clause).
149 Mass. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, 2000-7 (2000), available at http://www.mass.gov
/courts/sjc/cje/00-7h.html; Wash. Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 04-01 (2004), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/programs_orgs/pos_ethics/index.cfm?fa=pos_ethics.dispopin
&mode=0401; Press Release No. 37, Judicial Council of California, Supreme Court Takes
Action on California Code Of Judicial Ethics (June 18, 2003), http://www.courts.ca.gov
/news2003-50.htm. But see Del. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2006-4 (2006), available
at http://courts.delaware.gov/jeac/opns/06-4.pdf (deciding that judges do not need to disclose
their membership in the Boy Scouts in cases where homosexual persons are present as parties
or lawyers).
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In a 2004 opinion, a bare four-vote majority of the State of Washington’s Ethics
Advisory Committee ordered that judges could not hold positions of leadership in-
volved in policy and planning for the Boy Scouts.150 The majority opinion first inter-
preted the state’s invidious discrimination canon, which bars “membership in any
organization practicing discrimination prohibited by law.”151 Several municipalities
in Washington bar discrimination based on sexual orientation, and the Committee said
it expects judges to “conform their associations with organizations to the requirements
of these local laws.”152
The Committee continued, however, and said that “[t]hese considerations do not
end the inquiry.”153 It turned to Canon 2(A), which states that judges should “act at all
times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary” and Canon 5(B), which provides that judges should not engage in
civic and charitable activities that “reflect adversely upon their impartiality.”154
Based on these canons, the Committee barred judges from “a leadership role” in the
regional council of the Scouts, which supervises activities at numerous troops in the
area.155 The Committee permitted judges to participate as leaders at the local troop
level, where they would “not [be] actively involved in planning and implementing the
national organization’s policy excluding members based on their sexual orientation.”156
Even then, however, the inquiring judge was instructed to disqualify himself from
cases “when doing so is appropriate” and to disclose his participation to the lawyers
in any particular case where the parties “may consider it relevant.”157 Three members
of the Committee dissented, although they also said that judges should disclose their
affiliation and offer to withdraw from any cases where the parties may deem this
information relevant.158
Two years later, the Delaware Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee followed a
very similar path in its opinion on this subject.159 Like Washington, Delaware’s Code
barred judicial membership in organizations that engage in “any invidiously discrim-
inatory membership practices prohibited by applicable law.”160 Because the U.S.
150 Wash. Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 04-01 (2004), available at http://www.courts.wa
.gov/programs_orgs/pos_ethics/index.cfm?fa=pos_ethics.dispopin&mode=0401.
151 Id. (citing WASH. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 2(C)).
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.; WASH. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 2(A), 5(B); cf. MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 1.2, 3.1(C) (2007).
155 Wash. Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 04-01 (2004), available at http://www.courts.wa
.gov/programs_orgs/pos_ethics/index.cfm?fa=pos_ethics.dispopin&mode=0401.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Del. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2006-4, 12 (2006), available at http://courts
.delaware.gov/jeac/opns/06-4.pdf.
160 Id. at 6 (citing DEL. JUDGES’ CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 2C cmt.) (emphasis
in original).
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Supreme Court concluded in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale161 that the Scouts had
a First Amendment right to set standards for their leaders, the Committee concluded
that the practice was “not ‘prohibited by applicable law.’”162
The Delaware Committee proceeded to ask whether the judge’s involvement
“would cause a reasonable person to believe that the judge is biased or prejudiced”
in violation of the general impartiality clauses.163 The Committee adopted what it de-
scribed as the “middle ground . . . because it offers the flexibility to consider each
individual case.”164 The Committee said that the judge who submitted the inquiry
could participate as a member of both his troop and council committee, because “[i]t
. . . appears unlikely that the Council will be asked to enforce the policy in the
future.”165 However, the Committee further stated that if a situation arose where the
judge was “called upon to be involved directly or indirectly with enforcing the BSA’s
policy of prohibiting homosexual membership, the Committee suggests that [the
judge] consider either resigning [the judge’s] leadership positions at that time or, at the
very least, recusing [himself] from any discussion or involvement regarding the BSA
policy.”166 In short, Delaware’s Judicial Ethics Committee interpreted its rules to
permit the judge to serve as a leader only so long as he had no involvement in the
BSA’s policy on leadership standards.167
Though some have suggested that all judicial participation in the Boy Scouts
should be barred by the invidious discrimination clause,168 thus far Washington’s
opinion barring judges from holding leadership positions in the Scouts is the most
extreme policy in the nation. Delaware follows with its opinion permitting judicial
involvement, so long as BSA’s policy on homosexuality does not come before a
committee on which the judge sits.169 Moreover, two ethics advisory panels and one
state supreme court have stated that any involvement with the Boy Scouts, whether
as a leader or a member, though not banned by the Code, may require recusal from
cases involving homosexual litigants.170 Though the Washington Committee split
4-3 on the question of whether a judge may be a member of the local BSA council,
161 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
162 Del. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2006-4, 7 (2006), available at http://courts
.delaware.gov/jeac/opns/06-4.pdf.
163 Id. at 8.
164 Id. at 11.
165 Id. at 12.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Bleich, supra note 146.
169 Del. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2006-4, 12 (2006), available at http://courts
.delaware.gov/jeac/opns/06-4.pdf.
170 CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, Canon 3 (E) cmt.; Mass. Comm. on Judicial Ethics,
Op. 2000-7 (2000), available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/cje/00-7h.html; Wash. Ethics
Advisory Comm., Op. 04-01 (2004), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/programs_orgs
/pos_ethics/index.cfm?fa=pos_ethics.dispopin&mode=0401.
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the Committee was unanimous in stating that “[t]he judicial officer should disclose
the association in any proceeding in which the judicial officer believes the parties
or their lawyer might consider this information relevant to the question of disqualifi-
cation and the judicial officer should also offer to withdraw from the case.”171 When
presented with a question about a judge’s attendance at a fund-raiser for the Boy
Scouts, the Massachusetts Committee on Judicial Ethics went out of its way to opine
that “your attendance at this event may conceivably form the basis of a recusal
motion in a case involving gay litigants or lawyers. If presented with such a motion,
you will have to make your own judgment as to whether recusal is required under
the guiding principles . . . .”172
The California Code of Judicial Ethics specifically exempts “membership in a non-
profit youth organization” such as the Boy Scouts from the invidious discrimination
clause.173 In 2000 and 2003, several local bar associations and attorneys petitioned the
California Supreme Court to remove the exemption due to the Boy Scouts’ policy on
homosexual leaders.174 In 2000, the Court maintained the status quo, but in 2003 the
Court added new language to the commentary on Canon 3(E), which governs disquali-
fication (a.k.a. recusal).175 The new comment provides, in whole:
In some instances, membership in certain organizations may have
the potential to give an appearance of partiality, although member-
ship in the organization generally may not be barred by Canon 2C,
Canon 4, or any other specific canon. A judge holding membership
in an organization should disqualify himself or herself whenever
doing so would be appropriate in accordance with Canon 3E(1),
3E(4), or 3E(5) or statutory requirements. In addition, in some
circumstances, the parties or their lawyers may consider a judge’s
membership in an organization relevant to the question of dis-
qualification, even if the judge believes there is no actual basis for
disqualification. In accordance with this Canon, a judge should dis-
close to the parties his or her membership in an organization, in
any proceeding in which that information is reasonably relevant
171 Wash. Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 04-01 (2004) (minority opinion), available at http://
www.courts.wa.gov/programs_orgs/pos_ethics/index.cfm?fa=pos_ethics.dispopin&mode=0401.
172 Mass. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 2000-7 (2000), available at http://www.mass.gov
/courts/sjc/cje/00-7h.html; see Mass. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 2001-1 (2001), available
at http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/cje/2001-1h.html (stating that although BSA membership
does not violate the invidious discrimination clause, “[t]he foregoing [conclusion] is not to say
that there are no conceivable circumstances under which you might be required . . . to recuse
yourself from cases because of your Boy Scout membership.”) (citations omitted).
173 CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, Canon 2 (C).
174 Press Release No. 37, Judicial Council of California, supra note 149.
175 Id.
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to the question of disqualification under Code of Civil Procedure
section 170.1, even if the judge concludes there is no actual basis
for disqualification.176
In a Los Angeles Times story following the Court’s adoption of the commentary,
Ms. Angela Bradstreet, a former president of the San Francisco Bar Association, said,
“If the attorneys are openly gay and the litigants are openly gay, this could be poten-
tially an issue, and the judge under the amendment would have a duty to disclose his
membership.”177 The reporter also wrote that Ms. Bradstreet believed “the amendment
will force judges to step down in cases involving gay lawyers, gay adoptions and anti-
gay discrimination.”178 Thus, in California, mere membership in the Boy Scouts may
force judges to recuse themselves from a wide range of cases, and this may encourage
litigants to engage in strategic selection of counsel and judge shopping.
These precedents regarding the Boy Scouts prompt a compelling concern for the
religious liberty of judges, because the governing provisions are the same, and the
similarity between the BSA’s moral stance towards homosexuality and the moral
stance of many religious organizations is so great. Based on the Washington and
Delaware opinions, an ethics panel could order that while judges could be members
of, for example, Southern Baptist churches, they may not be delegates to annual state
or national conventions, or lay members of state or national executive committees,
because those positions may include votes on the nature of marriage as between one
man and one woman. Based on the Washington opinion and California commentary,
Catholic judges may have to disclose their parish membership in cases involving homo-
sexual lawyers or litigants, and potentially withdraw if the parties requested it.179 The
logic of these Boy Scout opinions may lead to significant restrictions on the religious
liberty of judges.
In sum, these concerns about possible partiality take two tacks: bias for or against
particular litigants because of their moral or religious beliefs, and bias for or against
legal propositions which may comport or conflict with religious beliefs held by the
judge. How should such concerns be treated by judges and the ethics panels that
advise and govern them?180
176 CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, Canon 3 (E) cmt., available at http://www.courts.ca
.gov/xbcr/cc/ca_code_judicial_ethics.pdf.
177 Maura Dolan, Judges in Boy Scouts Could Face Conflict, L.A. TIMES, June 19, 2003,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jun/19/local/me-scouts19.
178 Id.
179 Cf. Rebekah L. Osborn, Note, Beliefs on the Bench: Recusal for Religious Reasons and
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 895, 902–05 (2006).
180 Recall the test from NTEU: “The Government must show that the interests of both
potential audiences and a vast group of present and future employees in a broad range of pres-
ent and future expression are outweighed by that expression’s ‘necessary impact on the actual
operation’ of the Government.” United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454,
468 (1994) (quoting in part Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571 (1968)).
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These concerns should be taken seriously. Litigants in individual cases, and the
American people, expect “a fair, independent, and impartial judiciary—and one that
appears to be such.”181 Public confidence in public employees is generally an impor-
tant value in a republic based on the rule of law, and the Court has held in the past that
this can justify restrictions on employee speech.182 These concerns are particularly pro-
nounced in the area of the judiciary because “[p]ublic opinion plays an important role
in determining how court decisions are enforced. Loss of confidence in the judiciary
could negatively affect the enforcement of court decisions.”183 Moreover, the reality
remains that some citizens may not be able to separate the public duties of a judge
from his unofficial activities; they assume the one spills over into the other.184 Thus,
the government has a significant interest at stake when these questions arise.
That said, judges and religious organizations also have significant interests at
stake. The congregants have a strong interest in both hearing the judge speak—if they
have invited him to talk about a particular topic—and in his leadership—if they have
181 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
182 San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 389
(1987) (stating that the damage was less because the plaintiff “had [not] discredited the office
by making her statement in public.”); id. at 400 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A public employer has
a strong interest in preserving its reputation with the public.”); Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159,
179 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Where a Government employee’s job quintessentially involves public
contact, the Government may take into account the public’s perception of that employee’s ex-
pressive acts in determining whether those acts are disruptive to the Government’s operations.”).
183 Gross, supra note 41, at 1205–06; see also Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 198–99
(2d Cir. 2003); Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 146–47 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a teacher’s
unique position of public respect and trust in the community weighs in favor of the government’s
interest in policing the speech of its teachers).
184 Miss. Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Wilkerson, 876 So.2d 1006, 1019 (Miss. 2004)
(Carlson, J., dissenting) (“A judge cannot wear one face as a judicial officer and another as a
private citizen, since the citizenry will always appraise the integrity, independence and impar-
tiality of the judiciary by what they see in all public and private activities of our judges.”); see
Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’
Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 6 (2009) (“These decisions reflect
courts’ intuition that the public will inevitably associate public employees’ off-duty expression
with their governmental employers[.]”); id. at 52 (positing that police officers and firefighters
“can never shed their roles as employees because ‘part of their job is to safeguard the public’s
opinion of them’—a job duty that binds them at all times. Indeed, law enforcement agencies
have uniquely strong expressive interests among government entities because of their reliance
upon public trust and cooperation for their effectiveness.”). However, I believe most citizens
can understand that judges do retain some personal ability to participate in community life as
individuals. Gross, supra note 41, at 1262 (“[T]he public is less likely to believe the judge is
acting in a judicial capacity when speaking out-of-court. Therefore, his speech is less likely to
affect adversely the public’s perception of the judge and the judiciary.”); cf. Latino Officers
Ass’n v. New York, 196 F.3d 458, 468 (2d Cir. 1999) (rejecting an argument that “the public
is likely to believe that the NYPD itself is speaking” when a number of officers use vacation
time to march, in uniform and behind an LOA banner, in an ethnic pride parade).
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selected him for a position of responsibility in the church.185 The judge, moreover,
has an exceptionally strong interest in engaging in religious speech and association.
Religion places a uniquely strong call on the lives and actions of adherents, and be-
lievers respond to these demands with faith and fidelity.186 Moreover, the interests
of both the congregants and the judge are at the core of the First Amendment.187 As
Justice Douglas wrote in his dissent in National Association of Letter Carriers, another
key public employee rights case, political speech is “as deeply embedded in the First
Amendment as proselytizing a religious cause.”188 Both religious and political speech
lie at “the core of the freedoms the First Amendment was designed to protect.”189 The
interests that the government must overcome are very strong.
How, then, should judges and ethics boards resolve this potential conflict? For
three reasons, I believe that the precedent suggests that in virtually every case, the tie
goes to the judge and to religious liberty. First, courts are generally skeptical of ex ante
prior restraint. Cases characterize it as a “particularly heavy [burden for] . . . a blan-
ket policy designed to restrict expression by a large number of potential speakers.”190
Moreover, one factor makes the government’s burden of justification even heavier
to bear in the case of religious activity. In NTEU, addressing a ban on honoraria, the
Court held that “prohibition on compensation unquestionably imposes a significant
burden on expressive activity.”191 In the case of the ethics codes discussed above, the
185 NTEU, 513 U.S. at 470 (“The large-scale disincentive to Government employees’
expression also imposes a significant burden on the public’s right to read and hear what
the employees would otherwise have written and said. We have no way to measure the true
cost of that burden, but we cannot ignore the risk that it might deprive us of the work of a
future [Hughes, Washington, Thompson, Marshall, McLean, Miller, Strong, Brewer, Harlan,
or Butler].”) (internal citations omitted).
186 Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise
of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1496–97 (1990).
187 Since NTEU, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has suggested this as an
additional consideration: “The more speech touches on matters of public concern, the greater the
level of disruption the government must show.” Melzer, 336 F.3d at 197; see Lewis v. Cowen,
165 F.3d 154, 162 (2nd Cir. 1999); Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1995). This too
weighs in favor of the religious expression of judges. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
188 U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 598 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
189 See Harman v. New York, 140 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 1998).
190 Id.; see also Crue v. Aiken, 370 F.3d 668, 682 (7th Cir. 2004) (characterizing NTEU as
a strict scrutiny test); Sanjour v. EPA, 56 F.3d 85, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[W]e believe that the
extraordinary reach of the challenged regulations places a heavy justificatory burden on the
government—or put another way, the great quantity of speech affected by the regulatory scheme
weighs heavily on the side of the employees.”); In re Sanders, 955 P.2d 369, 370 (Wash. 1998)
(“[T]he constitutional concern weighs more heavily in that balance, requiring clear and con-
vincing evidence of speech or conduct that casts doubt on a judge’s integrity, independence,
or impartiality in order to justify placing a restriction on that right [to free speech].”).
191 United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S., 454, 468 (1994); see Sanjour,
56 F.3d at 94 (holding that denial of travel reimbursement is a “greater impediment” to the
speech of employees than the honoraria ban in NTEU); see also Crue, 370 F.3d at 682 (“The
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restrictions are placed directly on free exercise, speech, and association, without any
intermediary consideration.
Second, the decisions in the public employee cases are especially hesitant to regu-
late speech that occurs outside the governmental workplace and on topics “largely
unrelated to their Government employment.”192 In NTEU, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
dissent acknowledged that “the Government’s interests are at their lowest ebb” where
the speech is off-duty and unrelated to the employee’s work.193 This is the case with
religious speech or activity that occurs outside the workplace and which concerns
religious topics.
Third, the cases take a very dim view of generalized assertions about how people
might possibly feel in various situations. The government cannot “simply ‘posit the
existence of the disease sought to be cured.’”194 It may not “deter[ ] an enormous quan-
tity of speech before it is uttered, based only on speculation that the speech might
threaten the Government’s interests.”195 Rather, the government “must demonstrate
that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural.”196 The government cannot bear
this burden; as in NTEU and Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, generalized con-
cerns about the “appearance of impropriety” and perceived “bias” are insufficient.197
distinction between a relatively mild preclearance directive and a broad general prohibition
on speech in the employment context—i.e., a full-fledged prior restraint—is significant.”);
Weaver v. U.S. Info. Agency, 87 F.3d 1429, 1431–32 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1251 (1997) (holding that a prepublication clearance requirement is a lesser, and acceptable,
burden on employees of USIA).
192 NTEU, 513 U.S. at 466; see San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (“[W]hen govern-
ment employees speak or write on their own time on topics unrelated to their employment,
the speech can have First Amendment protection, absent some governmental justification ‘far
stronger than mere speculation’ in regulating it.”) (citing NTEU, 513 U.S. at 465, 475);
Eberhardt v. O’Malley, 17 F.3d 1023, 1026–27 (7th Cir. 1994) (“This is true even if—indeed,
especially if—the protected expression has nothing to do with the employee’s job or with the
public interest in the operation of his office. The less his speech has to do with the office, the less
justification the office is likely to have to regulate it.”) (internal citation omitted); cf. Wolfe
v. Barnhart, 446 F.3d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir. 2006) (upholding a restriction on an admin-
istrative law judge publishing an academic textbook regarding the subject area of his job).
193 NTEU, 513 U.S. at 494 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
194 Id. at 475 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994)).
195 Id. at 467 n.11.
196 Id. at 475; see Harman v. New York, 140 F.3d 111, 122 (1998) (“Where the pre-
dictions of harm are proscriptive, the government cannot rely on assertions, but must show
a basis in fact for its concerns.”); Ian H. Morrison, Note, The Case for Minimal Regulation
of Public Employee Free Speech: A Critical Analysis of the Federal Honoraria Ban
Controversy, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 141, 178 (1995) (“One of the major
reasons that the Honoraria Ban crumbled under constitutional scrutiny was that it targeted
nonexistent problems.”). But see Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 179 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he
disruption need not be actual; the Government may legitimately respond to a reasonable
prediction of disruption.”).
197 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775 (2002); NTEU, 513 U.S. at 472
(“The Government’s underlying concern is that federal officials not misuse or appear to
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An analogous case arose in Navab-Safavi v. Broadcasting Board of Governors.198
An employee of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) participated in the pro-
duction of an anti-war video outside of work.199 The BBG could not justify firing her
based on an immediate workplace disruption because the activity took place outside
the workplace.200 Moreover, the agency also could not justify firing her under the
“workplace harmony” rationale because the BBG did not demonstrate that such rela-
tionships were necessary for the agency’s operations, and there was no evidence the
video harmed those relationships.201 Therefore, the agency was left with, in its words,
a general “interest in protecting the journalistic integrity and credibility of Voice of
America programming.”202 The court rejected BBG’s rationale, concluding, “[w]here
a government agency cannot show that an employee’s speech caused any ‘concrete
harm’ to the ‘public’s confidence’ in the agency’s performance of its services, the
mere assertion of an otherwise legitimate governmental concern cannot outweigh
the employee’s ‘interest . . . .’”203 This case is a concrete application of the general
principle in NTEU and White that generalized assertions of “bias” or an “appearance
of impropriety” that supposedly “undermine public confidence” are not sufficient
to justify significant ex ante governmental restraint on speech and association. This
conclusion should lead ethics regulators to give the religious liberty of judges greater
respect when cases arise.
CONCLUSION
Reviewing all these considerations, it is clear that the vast majority of restrictions
on the religious expression of judges are unconstitutional. Judges, like all other public
employees, give up some degree of constitutional rights when they choose public
employment. However, though the government may legitimately intrude on their
rights, it may not do so haphazardly. Rather, particularly when dealing with a core
First Amendment right like religious expression, the government must meet a heavy
misuse power by accepting compensation for their unofficial and nonpolitical writing and
speaking activities.”); id. at 476 (referring to congressional concerns about “appearances of
impropriety.”); see also Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 213 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that the
judicial discipline commission failed “to explain precisely how Scott’s public criticisms would
impede the goals of promoting an efficient and impartial judiciary.”). But see Kirchgessner v.
Wilentz, 884 F. Supp. 901, 913 (D.N.J. 1995), aff’d, 92 F.3d 1171 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
519 U.S. 1108 (1997) (holding that notions of judicial impartiality were sufficiently “real” and
“not merely conjectural” to permit a rule that prohibited probation officers from joining state
police unions).
198 650 F. Supp. 2d 40 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 637 F.3d 311 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
199 Id. at 48.
200 Id. at 57.
201 Id. at 57–58.
202 Id. at 58.
203 Id. at 60 (internal citations omitted).
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burden of justification when it promulgates a regulation that preemptively proscribes
such expression. This is particularly true when, as here, the speech takes place off-duty
and concerns topics unrelated to the employee’s official duties. Unfortunately, all states
have judicial ethics codes that abridge the religious activity of judges.204 Numerous
judicial ethics commissions have issued official interpretations that further curb these
rights.205 Analyzing such restrictions under the relevant precedents, it is clear that many
of these constitute unconstitutional infringements on the rights of judges.
In United Public Workers, Justice Stanley Reed wrote for the Court: “Appellants
urge that federal employees are protected by the Bill of Rights and that Congress may
not ‘enact a regulation providing that . . . no federal employee shall attend Mass or take
any active part in missionary work.’ None would deny such limitations on congres-
sional power.”206 In the spirit of Justice Reed’s statement, virtually all of the rules and
advisory opinions discussed in this Article should be modified or withdrawn to respect
the religious liberty of judges.
204 See supra Part II for a discussion of state judicial ethics codes.
205 See supra Part II.
206 United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947); see also Ex parte Curtis,
106 U.S. 371, 377 (1882) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“Congress might just as well, so far as the
power is concerned, impose, as a condition of taking any employment under the government,
entire silence on political subjects, and a prohibition of all conversation thereon between gov-
ernment employes [sic]. Nay, it might as well prohibit the discussion of religious questions,
or the mutual contribution of funds for missionary or other religious purposes.”).
A final pair of sources that was helpful to the entire topic of this Article but was not
cited elsewhere are Thomas C. Berg & William G. Ross, Some Religiously Devout Justices:
Historical Notes and Comments, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 383 (1998) and Peter Alan Bell,
Extrajudicial Activity of Supreme Court Justices, 22 STAN. L. REV. 587 (1970).
